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A GIANT STEP BACKWARDS: ALYESKA PIPELINE
SERVICE CO. v. WILDERNESS SOCIETY' AND ITS
EFFECT ON PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION
In Alyeska PiPeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Sdciety, the Supreme
Court sounded a death knell to growing hopes that the judiciary would
exercise its equity powers to shift the prevailing party's attorneys' fees to
the losing litigant in public interest litigation.2 In doing so, the Court
expressly reaffirmed the "American Rule" under which attorneys' fees gen-
erally are not recoverable by the prevailing litigant in federal litigation. 3
Congress has often acted to mitigate the severity of the American Rule by
authorizing awards of attorneys' fees to litigants suing under specific
statutes.4 The courts had also awarded attorneys' fees under two judicially
1. 421 U.S. 240 (1975) (Brennan & Marshall, JJ., dissenting; Douglas &
Powell, JJ., not participating).
2. See, e.g., Nussbaum, Attorney's Fees in Public Interest Litigation, 48
N.Y.U.L. REV. 301 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Nussbaum]; Note, Awarding Attor-
neys' Fees to the "Private Attorney General": Judicial Green Light to Private Litiga-
tion in the Public Interest, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 733 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
Judicial Green Light]; Note, The Allocation of Attorneys' Fees After Mills v.
Electric Auto-Lite Co., 38 U. CHI. L. REv. 316 (1971) [hereinafter cited as After
Mills]; Comment, Court Awarded Attorneys' Fees and Equal Access to the Courts,
122 U. PA. L. REv. 636 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Equal Access].
3. 421 U.S. at 247, 270-71. For application of the American Rule, see F.D. Rich
Co. v. United States ex rel. Industrial Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 126-31 (1974);
Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 717-18 (1967);
Stewart v. Sonneborn, 98 U.S. 187 (1878); Flanders v. Tweed, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.)
450 (1873); Oelrichs v. Spain, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 211 (1872); Day v. Woodworth,
54 U.S. (13 How.) 363 (1852); Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306 (1796).
4. See, e.g., Amendment to Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)
(4) (E) (Supp. IV, 1974); Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act § 7, 7 U.S.C. §
499g(b) (1970); Bankruptcy Act of July 1, 1898, 11 U.S.C. §§ 104(a) (1), 641-44
(1970); Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970); Unfair Competition Act § 801, 15
U.S.C. § 72 (1970); Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1970) ; Trust Inden-
ture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77ooo(e), 77www(e) (1970) ; Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i(e), 78r(a) (1970); Copyright Act § 116, 17 U.S.C. § 116
(1970) ; Truth-in-Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (3) (Supp. IV, 1974) amending
15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (1970) ; Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 tit. IX § 901(a),
18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1970); Education Amendments of 1972 tit. VII § 718, 20 U.S.C.
§ 1617 (Supp. IV, 1974) ; Norris-LaGuardia Act § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 107(e) (1970);
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 § 16, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1970) ; Longshoremen's
and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act Amendments of 1972 § 13, 33 U.S.C. §§
928(a) & (b) (Supp. IV, 1972) ; Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments
of 1972 tit. V § 505, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (1974) ; Marine Protection, Research and
Sanctuaries Act of 1972 tit. I § 105, 33 U.S.C. § 1415(g) (4) (Supp. IV, 1974) ; 35
U.S.C. § 285 (1970) (patent infringement); Clean Air Amendments of 1970, 42
U.S.C. § 1857h-2(d) (1970) ; Civil Rights Act of 1964 tit. VII § 706, 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-5(k) (1970); Civil Rights Act of 1964 tit. II § 204, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b)
(1970); Fair Housing Act of 1968 tit. VIII, 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (1970) ; Noise
Control Act of 1972 § 12, 42 U.S.C. § 4911(d) (Supp. IV, 1974) ; Railway Labor Act
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fashioned exceptions to the American Rule. Under the common benefit
exception attorneys' fees are awarded to a party whose successful suit
has generated a benefit that he shares with others not participating in
the litigation., Under the improper conduct exception a defendant whose
improper behavior has caused or oppressively complicated the suit is
required to pay the attorneys' fees of the prevailing plaintiff. 6 In Alyeska,
the Court halted the development of a third exception. It barred judicial
use of the "private attorneys general" theory7 to award attorneys' fees to
the environmentalist groups that had sued to prevent the construction of a
trans-Alaska oil pipeline which, as originally planned, would have violated
several statutes. Under the private attorneys general concept, awards of
attorneys' fees had been made to prevailing private or public interest liti-
gants whose suits had clarified or enforced the law.8 In an opinion remi-
niscent of the views of the late Justice Frankfurter that the judiciary
should abstain from law making and leave that responsibility to the national
legislature, 9 the Supreme Court reversed the United States Court of
§ 3(p), 45 U.S.C. § 153(p) (1970) ; Merchant Marine Act of 1936 § 810, 46 U.S.C. §
1227 (1970); Federal Communications Act of 1934 § 206, 47 U.S.C. § 206 (1970);
Interstate Commerce Act pt. I, 49 U.S.C. §§ 8 & 16(2) (1970) ; Interstate Commerce
Act pt. II, 49 U.S.C. § 908(b) (1970) ; FED. R. Civ. P. 37(a) & (c).
5. See notes 61-79 and accompanying text infra.
6. See notes 80-88 and accompanying text infra.
7. This doctrine was the basis of the lower court's order awarding attorneys'
fees. Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 495 F.2d 1026 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (en banc), rev'd
sub nom. Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
8. Many lower courts have recently used this rationale to redistribute the pre-
vailing party's attorneys fees. In Alyeska the Court noted this, 421 U.S. at 270 n.46,
citing cases that "erroneously ... employed the private-attorney-general approach" to
award attorneys' fees where the plaintiff had sued to vindicate constitutional or
statutory rights: Souza v. Travisano, 512 F.2d 1137 (1st Cir. 1975) (protection of
prison inmates' rights) ; Taylor v. Perini, 503 F.2d 899 (6th Cir. 1974) (prevention
of discriminatory treatment in prisons) ; Hoitt v. Vitek, 495 F.2d 219 (1st Cir. 1974)
(protection of inmates' civil rights against administrative discrimination) ; Fairley
v. Patterson, 493 F.2d 598 (5th Cir. 1974) (action to compel reapportionment to
protect voting rights) ; Cooper v. Allen, 467 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1972) (prevention of
racial discrimination in public employment) ; Knight v. Auciello, 453 F.2d 852 (1st
Cir. 1972) (per curiam) (fair rental enforced under 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970)) ; Lee
v. Southern Home Sites Corp., 444 F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1971) (suit in response to dis-
crimination in real estate sales); La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94 (N.D. Cal.
1972) (failure of governmental enforcement to prevent non-compliance with en-
vironmental protection and housing assistance laws). See also Brewer v. School
Bd., 456 F.2d 943 (4th Cir. 1972) (Winter, J., concurring), cert. denied, 406 U.S.
933 (1972) (suit to compel school desegregation); Harrisburg Coalition Against
Ruining the Environment v. Volpe, 381 F. Supp. 893 (M.D. Pa. 1974) (suit to
enjoin highway construction detrimental to the environment); Sierra Club v. Lynn,
364 F. Supp. 834 (W.D. Tex. 1973) (highway construction enjoined to protect en-
vironmental interests; losing party awarded attorneys' fees).
9. See, e.g., Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM.
L. REv. 527, 533-35, 538-40 (1947).
The vital difference between initiating policy, often involving a decided break
with the past, and merely carrying out a formulated policy, indicates the relatively
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Appeals for the District of Columbia and held that only Congress could
authorize such an exception to the American Rule.10
This Note will examine Alyeska and, more broadly, how the case fits
into the parameters of the American Rule. It will take a close look at
the history of the American Rule and the recognized exceptions to it and
will discuss many of the factors and precedents that the Court considered
or failed to consider in refusing to use its historical equity powers either
to extend the common benefit exception to cover the Alyeska facts or to
adopt the private attorneys general rationale.
Alyeska
In March, 1970, the Wilderness Society, the Friends of the Earth,
and the Environmental Defense Fund, Inc., sued to enjoin the Secretary
of the Interior" from issuing rights-of-way permits12 requested by Alyeska,
an oil company consortium.' 3 Alyeska planned to use the rights-of-way
over federally owned land in the construction of a trans-Alaska pipeline
designed to connect the lower states to the extensive new oil field discov-
ered in Alaska in 1968.14 The environmentalist plaintiffs claimed that the
issuance of the permits would violate the Mineral Lands Leasing Act,15
narrow limits within which choice is fairly open to courts and the extent to which
interpreting law is inescapably making law. To say that, because of this restricted
field of interpretive declaration, courts make law just as do legislatures is to
deny essential features in the history of our democracy. It denies that legislation
and adjudication have had different lines of growth, serve vitally different pur-
poses, function under different conditions, and bear different responsibilities.
Id. at 534.
10. 421 U.S. at 270-71.
11. Alyeska and the State of Alaska intervened in the suit in September of 1971.
421 U.S. at 4 n.7.
12. Wilderness Soc'y v. Hickel, 325 F. Supp. 422 (D.D.C. 1970).
13. Originally Atlantic Richfield Company, Humble Oil & Refining Company,
and the British Petroleum Corporation formed the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System
which was replaced in 1970 by Alyeska, owned by ARCO Pipeline Company, Sohio
Pipeline Company, Humble Pipeline Company, Mobil Pipeline Company, Phillips
Petroleum Company, Amerada Hess Corporation, and Union Oil Company of Cali-
fornia, 421 U.S. at 241-42 n.2.
14. The full extent of this oil field is not known, but knowledgeable estimates
range from ten to seventy billion barrels. If the higher estimates ultimately prove to
be correct, this oil field would be the second or third largest in the world and should
be of immense political advantage and use, ending much of the United States' depend-
ence on foreign oil. The discovery and the development of this field, then, are im-
mensely important to the country as well as to the oil companies. See Dominick &
Brody, The Alaska Pipeline: The Wilderness Society v. Morton and the Trans-
Alaska Pipeline Authorisation Act, 23 Am. U.L. Rv. 337, 348-49 n.43 (1973) [herein-
after cited as Dominick & Brody].
15. 30 U.S.C. § 185 (1970). The consortium applied for "special land use per-
mits," seeking as much as 246 feet more land width in some areas than the width-of-
the-pipe plus 50 feet right-of-way the Act authorized the Secretary of the Interior to
grant. 421 U.S. at 242 and n.4.
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the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA)' 8 and the
National Forest Lands - Use and Occupancy Act. 1 7 The district court
granted a temporary injunction 8 but later dissolved it and dismissed the
suit. 19 The plaintiffs appealed, and the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia expedited hearing the case in view of its urgency.2 0 Basing
its decision solely on the Secretary's violation of the Mineral Lands Leasing
Act, the court issued a permanent injunction without considering the com-
plex NEPA issues.21 The Supreme Court denied certiorari.22 Reacting
quickly to the injunction, Congress enacted the Trans-Alaska Pipeline
Authorization Act 23 which authorized prompt construction of the pipeline.
By the same Public Law, Congress amended the Mineral Lands Leasing
Act both to allow for Wider rights-of-way, such as those requested by
Alyeska, and to define with greater specificity the process by which rights-
of-way are to be awarded and the conditions under which they will be
held.24 The amended statute was generally less favorable to permit holders
and applicants than was. the original Mineral Lands Leasing Act.25 Con-
16. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1970). The plaintiffs contended that the Interior
Department's impact statement (comprising six volumes and costing over twelve
million dollars, Lieberman, 5-Year Fiqht on Alaska Pipeline Made It Better and
More Costly, N.Y. Times, May 26, 1974, § 1 at 1, col. 1) failed to consider adequately
either the alternative of a pipeline route through Canada or the deferral of a decision
until more information on a Canadian route could be considered. Wilderness Soc'y
v. Morton, 479 F.2d 842, 846 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
17. 16 U.S.C. § 497a (1970). The plaintiffs argued that a permit issued by the
Supervisor of the Forest Service violated the eighty acre limit imposed by these sec-
tions. See Wilderness Soc'y v. Hickel, 325 F. Supp. 422 (D.D.C. 1970).
18. 325 F. Supp. at 424.
19. 421 U.S. at 244. The dismissal decision of August 15, 1972, was unreported
and contained no findings of fact.
20. The court noted:
[Any decision further enjoining construction of this project will impose serious
costs on the oil companies who plan to build the pipeline and who have made
substantial investments. . . The project means much needed jobs and income
to the people of the State of Alaska, and ... badly needed revenues for the Alaska
State Treasury.
Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 479 F.2d 842, 847 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
21. Id. at 889, 893. The court noted that the NEPA issues were "not ripe for
adjudication at the present time." The necessity of considering these issues was
specifically obviated by Congress in the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act.
See notes 23-26 and accompanying text infra.
22. 411 U.S. 917 (1973).
23. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1651-55 (Supp. IV, 1974).
24. Act of November 16, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-153, tit. I § 101, 87 Stat. 576,
amending 30 U.S.C. § 185 (1970) (codified at 30 U.S.C. § 185 (Supp. III, 1973)).
25. For example, the new safety and liability standards, the requirement that all
permit holders pay fair market value for the right-of-way, costs of permit application
and monitoring are contained in 30 U.S.C. §§ 185(h), (1), (x) (1970). See Lieber-
man, 5-Year Fight on Alaska Pipeline Made It Better and More Costly, N.Y. Times,
May 26, 1974, § 1, at 1, col. 1. In an evaluation by Walter Hickel, an original
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gress acted to increase the nation's independent oil supply and to mitigate
the severe shortages which became apparent in the early 1970's and clearly
did not intend to make the oil companies the ultimate "winners" of this
litigation. As explained by Senator Henry Jackson, the new Act was
adopted "in spite of the testimony and arguments presented by industry
and administration spokesmen who advocated construction" of the Pipe-
line.26 As a result of the more stringent safety and financial liability re-
quirements imposed by the new Act, the environment was protected,
government monies were saved, and the public interest was served. 27
The environmentalist plaintiffs then sought in the court of appeals
to recover their costs and attorneys' fees expended in the litigation from
Alyeska, the State of Alaska, and the United States on the grounds
among others that they had acted as private attorneys general in enforcing
the Mineral Lands Leasing Act.2 s There was no statutory authorization
for the award of attorneys' fees under the Mineral Lands Leasing Act,
and the court concluded that neither of the two recognized exceptions2
to the American Rule applied to the facts. 0 Yet the court still permitted
the plaintiffs to recover because "the equities of this particular case sup-
port an award of attorneys' fees . . . .,, Recognizing that the plaintiffs
might not have undertaken the litigation without the possibility of such an
award, the court reasoned that the plaintiffs, "[a] cting as private attorneys
general, . . not only have . . . ensured the proper functioning of our
system of government, but . . . have protected in a very concrete manner
substantial public interests."' 2 Interpreting a 1966 cost statute3 3 to pro-
hibit their taxing attorneys' fees against the federal government without
defendant in the litigation: "That first pipeline wouldn't have just been an environ-
mental disaster.... [i]t would have been a total engineering disaster." Id. at 34, col. 4.
26. 119 CONG. REc. 22798 (July 17, 1973) (report to the Senate supporting the
Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act) (emphasis added).
27. Because the litigation directly caused the passage of the Act and secured
these public benefits, the court of appeals termed the litigation of "great therapuetic
value" and "a catalyst to effect change and thereby achieve a great public service."
See 495 F.2d at 1033-34.
28. Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 495 F.2d 1026 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (en banc).
29. For a discussion of the common benefit and improper conduct exceptions to
the American Rule, see notes 61-88 and accompanying text infra.
30. 495 F.2d at 1029.
31. Id. at 1036. Judge Wright wrote for the majority of four. Judges Mac-
Kinnon, Wilkey and Robb dissented.
32. Id. See also Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntary Clients in Public Interest
Litigation, 88 HARV. L. Rav. 849, 901 n.223 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Dawson,
Public Interest Litigation].
33. 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1970) provides:
Except as otherwise specifically provided by statute, a judgment for costs
but not including the fees and expenses of attorneys may be awarded to the
prevailing party in any civil action brought by or against the United States or
any agency or official of the United States acting in his official capacity. ...
(emphasis added).
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congressional provision, and refusing to hold the State of Alaska respon-
sible because it had voluntarily entered the suit simply to present another
viewpoint, 34 the court taxed the non-governmental defendant Alyeska only
with its proportionate share (one-half) of the environmental groups' fees.a5
In reversing these awards, the Supreme Court refused to adopt the
private attorneys general rationale for fee-shifting without specific con-
gressional authorization.3 6 After a largely historical review of prior cases
7
and prior federal statutes on attorneys' fees,38 the Court concluded that,
because neither the common benefit 39 nor the improper conduct40 excep-
tion applied in this case, there was no alternative to application of the
American Rule.
THE AMERICAN RULE AND ITS COMMON LAW EXCEPTIONS
The American Rule was adopted by the Supreme Court in 1796 in
Arcambel v. Wiseman,41 when the Court reversed an award of $1600 for
counsel's fees entered by a lower federal court. The Court recognized
that "the general practice of the United States is in opposition to [this
award]" even though the colonists had inherited from England a tradition
of awarding attorneys' fees to prevailing plaintiffs. In the English common
law courts, these awards were authorized by parliamentary statutes dating
from as early as 1275. In equity courts, awards had long been made regard-
34. 495 F.2d at 1036 n.8.
35. Id. at 1036. The vigorous dissents by Judges MacKinnon and Wilkey
objected to applying the private attorneys general rationale to the facts of the case
since they found only a public detriment in the delayed construction of the pipeline:
Alaskan oil will reach Americans at least three years later and cost at least $637
million more than initially intended. The dissents did not question the validity of the
private attorneys general rationale but argued strongly that it was inapplicable to the
facts. 495 F.2d at 1039-46.
36. 421 U.S. at 269-70. Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court.
37. Id. at 249-50, 253-57. Justice Marshall, however, argued in dissent that
there are "cases [which] plainly establish by presenting persuasive precedents an
independent basis for equity courts to grant attorneys' fees under several rather
generous rubrics." Id. at 277; accord, Justice Brennan's dissent, id. at 271-72. See also
notes 110-13 and accompanying text infra.
38. Id. at 250-57. Early statutes holding federal courts to the practice of the
state in which the federal court was located had expired or were repealed by 1800.
See also note 60 infra.
39. For a discussion of the common benefit exceptions to the American Rule, see
notes 61-79 and accompanying text infra. For a discussion of how the Court could
have applied the common benefit exception to the 4lyeska facts, see text accompany-
ing notes 94-105 infra.
40. For a discussion of the improper conduct exception, see notes 80-88 infra.
41. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306 (1796). The Court noted the infirmity of the principle:
"[E]ven if that practice [no awards of attorneys' fees] were not strictly correct in
principle, it is entitled to the respect of the court, till it is changed, or modified,
by statute."
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less of statutes.4 2 Perhaps the reluctance of American courts to shift the
cost of legal representation arose from the general distrust of the legal
profession prevalent in colonial society.4 3 Moreover, laymen often tried
their own cases, thus obviating the need for any fee-shifting. In addition,
the law, with its adversary system, has often been conceptualized as a
sporting contest with a winner and a loser; thus, it might be thought un-
fair, or unsportsmanlike, to burden the loser with the winner's costs, 44
including his attorneys' fees. It has been argued, however, that it was a
"process of gradual forgetting rather than a deep-seated moral argument
that has apparently caused the abolition of the prevailing party's right to
the recovery of his counsel fees."'45
Yet many attorneys today support the American Rule as "part of our
democratic tradition and a bulwark of equality." 46 In 1964, Justice Gold-
berg rejected the "historical accident" explanation of the origin of the
American Rule and defended the ban on fee-shifting as "a deliberate choice
to insure that access to the Courts be not effectively denied to those of
moderate means," 47 reasoning that a poor plaintiff would be deterred from
suing by the possibility of having to pay not only his but also his opponent's
costs. Whatever the rationale, the Supreme Court gradually armored the
42. Goodhart, Costs, 38 YALE L.J. 849, 851-56 (1929) [hereinafter cited as
Goodhart].
43. In every one of the colonies, practically throughout the 17th century, a lawyer
or attorney was a character of disrepute or suspicion. . . . In many of the
colonies, persons acting as attorneys were forbidden to receive any fee; in some,
all paid attorneys were barred from the courts; in all, they were subject to the
most rigid restrictions as to fees and procedures.
C. WARREN, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR 4 (1966 ed.).
44. See Goodhart, supra note 42, at 876-77; Note, Attorney's Fees: Where Shall
the Ultimate Burden Lief, 20 VAND. L. REV. 1216, 1220-24 (1967) [hereinafter cited
as The Ultimate Burden].
45. Ehrenzweig, Reimbursement of Counsel Fees and the Great Society, 54
CALIF. L. REV. 792, 799 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Ehrenzweig]. Professor Ehrenz-
weig called the American Rule "a festering cancer in the body of our law without
whose excision our society will not be great." Id. at 794.
46. 1962 ABA SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW, PROCEEDINGS,
REPORT OF COMMITTEE ON COMPARATIVE PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE 117-18. The report
continued: "[The American Rule] reduces the differences in part between the wealthy
and the poor and permits the less affluent to press for the redress of wrongs" without
the threat of paying his opponents attorneys fees. Id. at 118; accord, Fleischmann
Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967), discussed in notes
161-65 and accompanying text infra.
47. Farmer v. Arabian American Oil Co., 379 U.S. 227, 237 (1964) (concurring
opinion, quoting Judge Smith in the court below, 324 F.2d 359, 365). In Dawson,
Public Interest Litigation, supra note 32, the rationale that fewer poor litigants are
deterred from litigation by the American Rule than would be by the "English Rule"
is called an "unverifiable guess." Id. at 849. Perhaps American attorneys are re-
luctant to adopt fee-shifting because it would require that they relinquish the contingent
fee system that often pays so well. Court-awarded and statutorily prescribed attorneys'
fees probably would be lower than those recovered under a contingent fee arrangement.
1976]
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Rule with precedents 48 by fashioning only two exceptions to it since 1796,49
and assured its survival as a virtual legal oddity in present times.50
In 1853, Congress enacted a statute designed to standardize cost
awards in federal courts and which included specified amounts that pre-
vailing parties could recover from their opponents to pay attorneys' fees.51
Despite inflation, these specific amounts remained constant throughout
subsequent revisions;52 although awards under this statute were strictly
enforced by the Court,53 they were largely unsought after 1879, due to the
twenty dollar limit imposed by the statute.
Against this background of outmoded statutory amount limitations
and the federal courts' persistence in otherwise following the American
Rule, Congress has made express provisions in an increasing number of
48. See, e.g., F.D. Rich Co. v. United States ex reL. Industrial Lumber Co.,
417 U.S. 116, 126-31 (1974); Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co.,
386 U.S. 714, 717-18 (1967); Stewart v. Sonneborn, 98 U.S. 187 (1878); Flanders
v. Tweed, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 450 (1872); Oelrichs v. Spain, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.)
211 (1872); Day v. Woodworth, 15 U.S. (13 How.) 363 (1852); Arcambel v. Wise-
man, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306 (1796).
49. For a discussion of these exceptions, see notes 61-88 and accompanying
text infra.
50. For a discussion on the prevalence of fee-shifting in other countries, see
Baeck, Imposition of Fees of Attorney of Prevailing Party Upon the Losing Party
Under the Laws of Austria, 1962 PROCEaINGS, supra note 46, at 119; Baeck, Imposi-
tion of Legal Fees and Disbursements of Prevailing Party Upon the Losing Party -
Under the Laws of Switzerland, 1962 PROCEEDINGS 124; Dietz, Payment of Court
Costs by the Losing Party Under the Laws of Hungary, 1962 PROCEEDINGS 131;
Freed, Payment of Court Costs by the Losing Party in France, 1962 PROCEEDINGS
126; Schima, The Treatment of Costs and Fees of Procedure in the Austrian Law,
1962 PROCEEDINGS 121; and Nussbaum, supra note 2, at 310.
51. Act of Feb. 26, 1853, 10 Stat. 161 (1853) (emphasis added)
That in lieu of the compensation now allowed to attorneys, solicitors, and proctors
in the United States courts . . . the following and no other compensation shall
be taxed and allowed. But this act shall not be construed to prohibit attorneys,
solicitors and proctors from charging to and receiving from their clients, other
than the Government, such reasonable compensation for their services, in addition
to the taxable costs as may be in accordance with general usage . . . or may be
agreed upon between the parties.
The Act then specified the sums that could be taxed to compensate the lawyer
for the prevailing party, but these did not exceed a twenty dollar docket fee for civil
and criminal trials by jury or a final hearing in equity or admiralty.
52. The wording remained similar and the fee schedules the same through 1926
when they were codified as 28 U.S.C. §§ 521 & 572. When the Code was revised in
1948, the statute became 28 U.S.C. §§ 1920 & 1923(a), and the fee limits appeared to
become discretionary as the stricture "and no other compensation shall be allowed"
was removed. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1920, 1923(a) (1970). Nevertheless, the Alyeska Court
concluded that these changes did not alter "the longstanding rule limiting attorneys'
fees to the amounts schedule." 421 U.S. at 256 n.29. The dissent is critical of relying
on the statute as presently written as "an uncompromising bar to equitable fee awards."
Id. at 280.
53. Flanders v. Tweed, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 450 (1872); see In re Pashcal, 77
U.S. (10 Wall.) 483, 493-94 (1870) (dictum).
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laws54 for substantial awards of attorneys' fees to successful plaintiffs.
It has used the private attorneys general theory to authorize these awards
to the plaintiff whose suit protects public rights or interests.5 5 While some
laws prescribe a mandatory award of attorneys' fees56 to the prevailing
plaintiff, most provide that attorneys' fees be awarded at the court's dis-
cretion.57 As a result of these congressional enactments, the Supreme
Court in Alyeska concluded that only Congress could provide for the
award of attorneys' fees under the private attorneys general rationale ;58
thus, absent statutory guidance, the American Rule would operate to bar
an award of attorneys' fees to the environmental groups. 59
The Court's unwillingness to fashion another exception to the Ameri-
can Rule and allow fee-shifting for private attorneys general without statu-
tory authorization appears inconsistent with the Court's approval of the
two existing exceptions to the Rule. Both the common benefit and im-
proper conduct exceptions developed without congressional mandate and
thus depend solely on the Court's inherent equity powers.60 The com-
mon benefit exception originated over ninety years ago in Trustees v.
Greenough6 where the Court was faced with the obvious injustice of
holding a single creditor responsible for the entire cost of litigation when
the suit he won preserved a trust fund for other bondholders as well as
for himself. The Court held that the plaintiff's attorneys' fees should be
paid from the common fund so that all who benefited from the suit would
bear equally its financial burden.62
54. See note 3 supra.
55. The plaintiff can recover his attorneys' fees, for example, if he sues under
the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. § 1415(g) (4)
(Supp. IV, 1974); Clean Air Amendments of 1970, 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2(d) (1970);
Civil Rights Act of 1964 fit. II, 42 U.S.C. 2000a-3(b) (1970); Civil Rights Act of
1964 tit. VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1970); Noise Control Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C.
§ 4911(d) (Supp. IV, 1974).
56. Attorneys' fees are a mandatory award under the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 15 (1970); Truth-in-Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(3) (Supp. IV, 1974);
Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1970); Merchant Marine Act of
1936, 46 U.S.C. § 1227 (1970).
57. See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1970) ; Trust Inden-
ture Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77www(a) (1970); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S.C. §§ 78i(e), 78r(a) (1970); Clean Air Amendments of 1970, 42 U.S.C. §
1857h-2(d) (1970) ; Civil Rights Act of 1964 tit. II, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) (1970) ;
Civil Rights Act of 1964 tit. VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1970); Noise Control
Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. § 4911(d) (Supp. IV, 1974).
58. 421 U.S. at 271.
59. Id.
60. Federal courts from their inception have been endowed with equity jurisdic-
tion like that of the English Courts of Chancery. Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont
Bridge Co., 54 U.S. (15 How.) 556, 603 (1851). For a discussion of the historical
basis and extent of these powers, see Guardian Trust Co. v. Kansas City So. Ry.,
28 F.2d 233, 240-43 (8th Cir. 1928).
61. 105 U.S. 527 (1881).
62. Id. at 532.
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This exception was broadened considerably in Central Railroad &
Banking Co. v. Pettus63 where the attorneys who had brought a successful
class action sued to recover attorneys' fees from passive members of the
prevailing class. Even though the attorneys had been paid their agreed
upon fees by the named plaintiffs prior to the suit for fees and despite the
absence of an agreement with the inactive members of the class, the Court
allowed them to recover additional fees because "every ground of justice"
demanded that those who "accepted the fruits" of the litigation participate
in paying for it.64 While the common benefit exception had originally
operated to protect the prevailing plaintiff from the injustice of bearing
all attorneys' fees himself, Pettus went far beyond that rationale and gave
an independent right to additional fees to the lawyer.6 5
The common benefit concept was expanded still further in Sprague
v. Ticonic National Bank.66 The plaintiff obtained a lien on certain funds
of an insolvent bank where she was a depositor. The Court allowed her
to recover her attorneys' fees from these funds, reasoning that since the
principle of stare decisis operated to give other depositors rights to similar
liens, the plaintiff should recover her attorneys' fees from the common
funds. 67 Justice Frankfurter seized the occasion to note the Court's wide
equity powers that allow a shift of attorneys' fees in an attempt to avoid
injustice, 68 in spite of the longstanding American Rule.69
63. 113 U.S. 116 (1885).
64. Id. at 127. To secure their extra fee, the lawyers were given a lien on the
salvaged assets made available to the creditors.
65. Professor Dawson suggests that the Court must have been "bemused" to
allow the lawyers' "appeal to unjust enrichment" to satisfy "such a far-fetched
claim." Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntary Clients: Attorneys' Fees From Funds, 87
HARV. L. REv. 1587, 1604 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Dawson, Fees from Funds].
66. 307 U.S. 161 (1939).
67. Id. at 167.
68. Id. (emphasis added):
[W]hen such a fund is for all practical purposes created for the benefit of others,
the formalities of the litigation - the absence of an avowed class suit or the
creation of a fund, . . . through stare decisis rather than through a decree -
hardly touch the power of equity in doing justice as between a party and the
beneficiaries of his litigation.
While these equity powers have been used to award attorneys' fees only if
the attorneys' services were connected with litigation, there have been a few excep-
tions. See, e.g., Winton v. Amos, 255 U.S. 373 (1921) (securing beneficial legislation
for Choctaw Indians by successful lobbying); Blau v. Rayette-Faberge, Inc., 389
F.2d 469 (2d Cir. 1968) (notification of company official's illegal actions) ; Louisiana
State Mineral Bd. v. Abadie, 164 So. 2d 159 (La. App. 1964) (lobbying services).
69. The Court in Alyeska accorded only superficial recognition to these broadly
exercised discretionary powers by noting, in one paragraph, that the 1853 Act, note
51 supra, had been construed as not infringing or limiting the Court's equity powers.
421 U.S. at 257-58. The Alyeska Court thus overlooked the possible conclusion that
because the judiciary independently intervened to prevent injustice by awarding
attorneys' fees to the prevailing plaintiffs in the common benefit cases, similar discre-
tionary intervention should occur in this case. The dissent seized this point and
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These equity powers were again exercised by the Court in Mills v.
Electric Auto-Lite Co. 70 when the burden of paying attorneys' fees was
shifted from the individual stockholder, who sued because of misleading
proxy statements made by the company, to all the stockholders benefiting
from the suit. Again the Court exercised its discretionary power and
broadened the common benefit exception. Not only was the suit brought
under a statute7' silent regarding redistribution of attorneys' fees, but the
suit had "not yet produced, and may never produce a monetary recovery
from which the fees could be paid .... -72 Yet the Court held that the pre-
vailing plaintiff could recover his attorneys' fees from the company itself
because "regardless of the relief granted, private stockholders' actions of
this sort 'involve corporate therapeutics,' and furnish a benefit to all share-
holders by providing an important means of enforcement of the proxy
statute. ' 78 Although the common benefit exception to the American Rule
originated with a distinct fund from which the Court could draw the
monies for the plaintiff's attorneys' fees, in Mills the burden of the fees
was borne by the defendant corporation and ultimately by its shareholders,
a necessary shift since the suit had not generated any monetary benefit for
any of the prevailing parties.74 This liberal trend was supported in Hall
v. Cole,75 which shifted the plaintiff's attorneys' fees to the losing defendant
union which had been ordered to reinstate the plaintiff to union membership
after he had been expelled illegally for criticizing union officials. The suit
thus protected the freedom of speech of all the union's members. In forc-
ing the union, and consequently all the union members to pay the plaintiff's
attorneys' fees, the Court reasoned "that an award of counsel fees to a
successful plaintiff... [under a statute, the Labor Management Reporting
and Disclosure Act (LMRDA),76 that was silent in this regard] f[ell]
squarely within the traditional equitable power of federal courts to award
such fees" whenever necessary to prevent injustice, and was "consistent
argued that judicial use of the private attorneys general exception for fee awards isjustified by the Court's equity powers exercised in the common benefit cases. Id. at 275.
70. 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
71. Mills was based on a violation of the Securities Act of 1934 § 14(a), 15
U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1970).
72. 396 U.S. at 392.
73. Id. at 396 (footnotes omitted). See also Hornstein, The Connsel Fee in
Stockholders' Derivative Suits, 39 COLUm. L. REv. 784 (1939); Hornstein, Legal
Therapeutics: The "Salvage" Factor in Counsel Fee Awards, 69 HARV. L. REv. 658
(1954), which urged recovery for minority stockholders whose suits cleansed or im-
proved their companies.
74. See Dawson, Public Interest Litigation, supra note 32, at 868-69. Some
commentators were optimistic that Mills, through its shifting of attorneys' fees to
the defendants, heralded a move to change the American Rule. See Nussbaum and
A ter Mills, supra note 2.
75. 412 U.S. 1 (1973).
76. 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-12 (1970).
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with both the [LMRDA] and the historic equitable power of federal courts
to grant such relief in the interests of justice. '77
Thus the common benefit exception to the American Rule, originally
applied in the narrow situation in which the prevailing plaintiff sought to
secure his attorneys' fees from the specific fund that his suit recovered,7 8
expanded to encompass situations in which a significant, non-financial
benefit was secured.79 In theory and in practice, the Court accepted the
inherent justice of shifting the burden of the litigation from the plaintiff
to members of the plaintiff's class who also benefited from the suit. Where
necessary, the defendants in these cases were taxed with the fees because
they were the most appropriate parties for the distribution of the burden
among the beneficiaries.
More often, fees have been shifted to the losing litigant when he has
acted in bad faith. The Court has thus used its discretionary powers
and shifted the prevailing plaintiff's attorneys' fees to the losing litigant
in cases where the defendant has engaged in improper, oppressive, fraudu-
lent, or vexatious conduct. In Vaughn v. Atkinson,s ° for example, a sailor
had been forced to leave his ship to receive extended medical treatment. His
numerous requests to his employers for maintenance and cure payments to
which he was entitled were ignored. Because the defendant's persistent
and callous failures to pay or even to respond forced the plaintiff to go to
court, and because the fee of plaintiff's attorney would have consumed half
of the plaintiff's entitlement, the Court shifted the fee to the defendants.
In addition, fees have been awarded to the plaintiff when the defendant
has acted improperly during the suit,81 or where the defendant's conduct
unnecessarily prolonged the litigation. In Toledo Scale Co. v. Computing
Scale Cd.,82 for example, a patent infringement case, the defendant had
increased the cost of the litigation by vexatiously instituting new suits in
other jurisdictions to enjoin enforcement of the plaintiff's judgment.
Courts have also used the punitive rationale of this exception to provide
for the plaintiff's recovery of his attorneys' fees in civil rights litigation
where the defendant's conduct has neither been in good faith nor consistent
with his responsibilities. Thus the theory has been used to justify the
awards of attorneys' fees against defendants who had not made good
faith efforts to racially integrate schools,83 to effect legislative reappor-
77. 412 U.S. at 9, 14.
78. See text accompanying notes 61-62 supra.
79. See text accompanying notes 72-77 supra.
80. 369 U.S. 527 (1962).
81. First Nat'l Bank v. Dunham, 471 F.2d 712 (8th Cir. 1973); City Bank v.
Rivera Davila, 438 F.2d 1367 (1st Cir. 1971); Niday v. Graef, 279 F. 941 (9th
Cir. 1922).
82. 261 U.S. 399 (1923).
83. See Bell v. School Bd., 321 F.2d 494 (4th Cir. 1963). There the court con-
cluded that fee-shifting was justified because of the school board's
long continued pattern of evasion and obstruction which included not only [their]
unyielding refusal to take any initiative . . . but their interposing a variety of
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tionment,8 4 or to reinstate a college teacher dismissed for political reasons8 5
Indeed, it has even been held in a lower court that where there has been
a continued and "extreme" pattern of evasion and obstruction which pre-
cipitated the suit, "justice would not be attained" without an award of
reasonable counsel fees.8 6 This expanded concept of improper conduct
has been applied to behavior that obstructs the administration of justice,
regardless of whether that behavior necessitated the suit 8 7 or simply
prolonged it.88 The improper conduct exception has thus been applied to
complex situations where the courts apparently decided that counsel fee
awards were an appropriate, non-criminal form of punishment for the
defendants. Like the common benefit exception, the improper conduct
exception has been widely applied by the courts to award the prevailing
plaintiff his attorneys' fees when justice so demands.
In spite of its recognition of these judicially created exceptions, the
Court in Alyeska refused to exercise its equity powers again to fashion
an additional private attorneys general exception to the American Rule;
it simply distinguished the common benefit and improper conduct excep-
tions as not applicable to the Alyeska facts.8 9 The Court seemed more
anxious to fit Alyeska into a consistent chain of cases that follows the
American Rule than to rectify any injustice that may have occurred in not
shifting attorneys' fees. 90 Part of the explanation for the Court's refusal
to use the private attorneys general rationale was its concern with the
administrative problems posed by the rationale. For example, it would be
necessary to make difficult decisions as to whether the enforcement of a
administrative obstacles to thwart... a desegregated education .... The equitable
remedy would be far from complete, and justice would not be attained, if reason-
able counsel fees were not awarded in a case so extreme.
Id. at 500. See also Nesbit v. Board of Educ., 418 F.2d 1040 (4th Cir. 1969) ; Rolfe
v. County Bd. of Educ., 391 F.2d 77 (6th Cir. 1968) ; Hill v. Franklin County Bd. of
Educ., 390 F.2d 583 (6th Cir. 1968); Clark v. Board of Educ., 369 F.2d 661 (8th
Cir. 1966).
84. Sims v. Amos, 340 F. Supp. 691 (M.D. Ala.) (three-judge court) (alterna-
tive holding), aff'd mem., 409 U.S. 942 (1972); Dyer v. Love, 307 F. Supp. 974
(N.D. Miss. 1969).
85. Stolberg v. Board of Trustees, 474 F.2d 485, 491 (2d Cir. 1973). In McEn-
teggart v. Cataldo, 451 F.2d 1109 (1st Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 943 (1972),
the court awarded the plaintiff/teacher his counsel fees even though his dismissal
by defendants was upheld. The defendants' refusal to supply a statement of reasons
for dismissal was sufficiently improper to warrant the award "since plaintiff was
forced to go to court to obtain the statement of reasons to which he was constitu-
tionally entitled." 451 F.2d at 1112.
86. Bell v. School Bd., 321 F.2d 494, 500 (4th Cir. 1963).
87. Id. (school board refusal to take any initiative to desegregate the schools).
See also Rolax v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry., 186 F.2d 473 (4th Cir. 1922) (illegal
agreement to bar promotion of Negroes).
88. Toledo Scale Co. v. Computing Scale Co., 261 U.S. 527 (1962), discussed in
text accompanying note 82 supra.
89. 421 U.S. at 257-59, 269.
90. Id. at 250, 257.
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particular policy should warrant fee-shifting, whether the awards should
be mandatory or discretionary, whether a prevailing defendant should
recover, and whether the suit should raise a presumption in favor of the
plaintiff or against him.91 Additionally, the Court concluded that any non-
statutory award of attorneys' fees would be impossible in the large number
of cases where the government is a defendant, because taxing fees against
government defendants is explicitly barred by 28 U.S.C. § 2412.92 Appar-
ently, the Court did not find the desirability of awarding fees in the many
other cases involving private defendants the more persuasive considera-
tion. While noting the recent criticisms of the American Rule and tacitly
recognizing the desirability of encouraging private litigation to implement
public policy,93 the Court nevertheless chose judicial restraint and decided
that Congress, not the courts, must decide if, when, and how litigation
costs should be redistributed.
ALTERNATIVES REJECTED: WHAT MIGHT HAVE BEEN
The Court's refusal to accept the private attorneys general rationale
as a third exception to the American Rule need not have precluded an
award of attorneys' fees. The lower court concluded, without a thorough
analysis of the factors involved, that neither of the two traditional excep-
tions to the American Rule was applicable. 94 A closer examination of the
91. Id. at 263-64.
92. See note 33 supra. The legislative history of section 2412 supports the inter-
pretation that attorneys' fees generally are not to be taxed against the United States.
H.R. REP. No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. Appendix, at A189 (1947) ; H.R. REP. No.
1535, 89th Cong., 2, 3 (1966) ; S. REP. No. 1329, 2d Sess. 2, 3 (1966).
It can be argued, however, that state or federal governmental defendants
should pay attorneys' fees, from tax monies specifically allocated for law enforcement,
in suits where the plaintiffs are acting in the government's place to enforce the law.
This approach would view fee-shifting as another way of taxing the cost of law
enforcement to the public. See Mause, Winner Take All: A Re-examination of the
Indemnity System, 55 IOWA L. REv. 26, 37, 41-42 (1969). This argument is closely
related, then, to the common benefit rationale which distributes the burden of the
suit among those who benefit by it, as well as the improper conduct theory that forces
the party causing the expenses of the suit to pay those expenses. See also Equal
Access, supra note 2 and text accompanying notes 96-100, 104-05 infra.
93. 421 U.S. at 270-71. For criticism of the American Rule, see Ehrenzweig,
supra note 45; Falcon, Award of Attorneys' Fees in Civil Rights and Constitutional
Litigation, 33 MD. L. REv. 379 (1973); Goodhart, supra note 42; Kuenzel, The
Attorney's Fee: Why Not a Cost of Litigation?, 49 IOWA L. REv. 75 (1963) [herein-
after cited as Kuenzel]; McCormick, Counsel Fees and Other Expenses of Litigation
as an Element of Damages, 15 MINN. L. REv. 619 (1931); McLaughlin, The Recovery
of Attorneys' Fees: A New Method of Financing Legal Services, 40 FORD. L. Rav. 761
(1972); Nussbaum, supra note 2; Stoebuck, Counsel Fees Included in Costs: A
Logical Development, 38 U. COLO. L. REV. 202 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Stoebuck];
Judicial Green Light, supra note 2; After Mills, supra note 2; Equal Access, supra
note 2; The Ultimate Burden, supra note 44.
94. 495 F.2d at 1029. Even though the court noted that "every citizen's interest
in the proper functioning of our system of government" was served by the litigation,
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Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act and the litigation that stimulated
it, however, reveals that Alyeska furnished the Court with at least an
arguable case for the application of a somewhat expanded common benefit
exception. Although it was hotly debated in the court of appeals whether
the environmentalist groups' efforts in court aided or injured the public,
a majority of that court found substantial long-term benefit stemming
from the reforms inspired by the suit.95 Essentially, these reforms pro-
duced a pipeline system that will operate more effectively as a result of
the stringent standards imposed.96 In the evaluation of Russell B. Train,
later the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, the liti-
gation resulted in increased public safety and protection that was beneficial
to the government, the public, and the oil industry.9 7 The public benefited
as well from the increased tort liability and the higher permit and mainte-
nance prices that the new Act9" imposed.
Given this benefit, one logical approach for the Court to have taken
would have been to expand the common benefit exception to cover the
Alyeska facts. At first glance, such an expansion from fairly well defined
beneficiary classes such as stockholders of a corporation9 9 or all members
of a union to the more amorphous public at large100 would seem merely
to turn the common benefit exception into a private attorney general
theory. But by focusing on the benefit conferred, the common benefit
exception is intended to give effect to the equitable principle of avoiding
unjust enrichment' 1° to a far greater extent than is the private attorney
this interest was determined not to be dispositive of whether to apply the common
benefit exception. The court also deemed that the "appellees" legal position . . .was
manifestly reasonable and assumed in good faith." But see text accompanying note
107 infra.
95. 495 F.2d at 1029, 1032-36.
96. See Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 85(h), (l), and
(x) (Supp. IV, 1974) ; text accompanying notes 24-25 supra.
97. The Alaska Pipeline... has been an excellent example [of] where NEPA
and the courts have forced the reconciliation of environmental concerns with sound
engineering practices. . . . Much of the delay has been beneficial. . . . If the
pipeline had been constructed using the original design specifications it would
very likely have resulted in not only very serious environmental damage but also
serious operational problems. Indeed, the physical integrity of the pipeline itself
was very much at stake.
• .. [I]ndustry seriously underestimated the real technical difficulties of the
task . . . . [G]overnment was ill-equipped both institutionally and informationally
for dealing with the complex problems of the pipeline.
495 F.2d at 1034-35 n.3 quoting Remarks before the Joint Judicial Conference of the
Eighth and Tenth Circuits, June 29, 1973. See also note 25 supra (former Secretary
of Interior Hickel's similar response).
98. See the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 185(h), (l),
(m) & (x) (Supp. IV, 1974).
99. See, e.g., Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970), and text
accompanying notes 70-74 supra.
100. See, e.g., Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1 (1973).
101. See text accompanying notes 75-79 supra.
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general theory, with its focus on the enforcement of some law or legisla-
tive policy. Because the principle of avoiding unjust enrichment is so
firmly established as a principle of judge-made common law, 10 2 while the
private attorney general theory has more of a legislative pedigree, 10 3 an
expansion of the common benefit exception to cover the Alyeska facts
would have allowed the Court to do justice in the case with less of an in-
trusion into Congress's province than was perceived as the necessary effect
of judicial adoption of the private attorney general theory. 0 4
One of the prerequisites to application of the common benefit rationale
is a showing that the party against whom the award is to be made is a
proper party to bear or distribute the burden of the suit.105 In Alyeska
the oil company defendant was the proper intermediary to distribute the
cost of the litigation because these costs could have been easily passed
to the ultimate consumers of the oil in the form of higher prices. The dis-
tinction between the beneficiaries of the suit - the general public - and
the ultimate consumers of the oil - those members of the public who pay
for it - is more conceptual than factual. Additionally, it seems far more
equitable to distribute the costs of the suit to the millions of users than to
leave it with the three private citizen organizations that are supported by
private and often small donations.106 While this surely would have been
a substantial expansion of the common benefit exception, the Court has not
shied away from such expansions in the past and no compelling reason ap-
pears why the Court could not have made this further expansion in this case.
In addition to the common benefit-redistribution rationale, perhaps
on a closer examination of Alyeska's motives and behavior, the Supreme
Court could have applied the bad faith exception to award attorneys' fees
to the plaintiffs. In the debates surrounding the passage of the Trans-
Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act, both "the industry and the Adminis-
tration" were accused of "having been evasive, legalistic, and less than
102. The lower court called "spread[ing] the costs of litigation proportionately
among the beneficiaries, the key requirement of the 'common benefit' theory." 495
F.2d at 1029.
103. See, e.g., note 4 and accompanying text supra.
104. The Alyeska majority felt that fee awards under the private attorneys general
concept "would make major inroads on a policy matter that Congress has reserved
for itself." 421 U.S. at 269.
105. See Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 9 (1973); Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396
U.S. 375, 396-97 (1970). See also Yablonski v. United Mine Workers of America,
466 F.2d 434 (D.C. Cir. 1972) ; Robins v. Schonfeld, 326 F. Supp. 529 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
106. Cf. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 512 F.2d 1351 (D.C.
Cir. 1975), which recognized the funding difficulties that public interest environ-
mentalist groups have:
[These] [giroups such as NRDC have never been secure financially, and only
recently the foundations [as the Ford Foundation] have indicated their intent to
divert their support to projects in other areas. Provisions for fees could thus
have a strong impact on their continued willingness and ability to pursue . .
[statutory] actions.
Id. at 1358 (footnotes omitted).
A GIANT STEP BACKWARDS
credible" in dealing with the issues presented by the development of the
Pipeline.10 7 This raises doubts about the honesty of the industry's policies
and the independence of the various governmental agencies involved.
While such inferences alone are not substantial enough to satisfy the bad
faith requisite for fee-shifting under the improper conduct rationale, they
do warrant a closer look at the facts of the case. The Court did not make
this examination, however; it relied instead on the lower court's conclusory
assertions of good faith and reasonable behavior of Alyeska and the govern-
ment defendants without confronting the issue squarely. 0 8
THE DISSENT IN Alyeska: COMPLETE SUPPORT FOR THE
PRIVATE ATTORNEY GENERAL CONCEPT
Justice Marshall and Justice Brennan dissented in Alyeska. Justice
Marshall insisted that the adoption of the private attorneys general
rationale to award the plaintiffs their attorneys' fees was a viable and
preferable alternative to the majority's conclusion, 10 9 arguing that the
chains of precedent for the common law exceptions to the judge-made
American Rule" 0 illustrate that courts do have independent authority to
award attorneys' fees. Further, this kind of judicial activity is not pre-
empted by congressional activity because courts have acted to award fees
under statutory causes of action which make no provision for such awards"'
and have interpreted various statutory fee regulations as imposing no
restrictions on the equity powers of courts to redistribute attorneys' fees."12
Thus the fashioning of the private attorneys general exception to the Ameri-
can Rule would have been merely another exercise of these same equitable
powers, and not a judicial repudiation of the entire American Rule.113
Basic in Justice Marshall's vigorous dissent is a denial that congres-
sional action in the area of attorneys' fees prohibits or preempts the Court
from making independent decisions in the same area. 114 In response to
the majority's concern about manageable standards for application of the
107. 119 CONG. REc. 22798 (1973) (remarks of Senator Jackson). Senator Jackson
also noted that the companies "ridiculously downgraded the oil and gas potential of
the [Alaska oil fields]." Id. at 22799. See also note 21 supra.
108. 421 U.S. at 259-60.
109. Id. at 271-72 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 273-74 (Marshall, J., dis-
senting).
110. See notes 61-77 and 80-88 and accompanying texts supra.
111. See, e.g., Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite, notes 70-74 supra and Hall v. Cole,
notes 75-77 supra.
112. See, e.g., the docketing fees statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1923 (1970), notes 51-52
supra, as construed in cases awarding fees under the exceptions to the American
Rule: Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 n.11
(1967) ; Sprague v. Ticonic Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 164 (1939) ; Trustee v. Greenough,
105 U.S. 527, 535-36 (1881).
113. 421 U.S. at 274, 282.
114. Id.
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rationale, 115 the dissent proposed a three-prong test to identify those cases
that warrant fee-shifting. Fees would be awarded to the prevailing plain-
tiff if (1) the right protected is one shared by the general public or some
class thereof; (2) the plaintiff's pecuniary interest in the outcome, if any,
would not normally justify incurring the cost of counsel fees; and (3)
shifting that cost to the defendant would effectively place it on a class
that benefits from the litigation. 116 The first two requirements were met
in Alyeska, Justice Marshall asserted, by the governmental and public
benefit derived 17 and the environmentalists' "largely altruistic" willing-
ness to litigate these issues."" In response to the third requirement,
Justice Marshall argued that because the consortium does business in forty-
nine states and accounts for twenty percent of the national oil market,
Alyeska was the proper intermediary to shift the costs of the litigation to
the benefiting general public." 9  The majority criticized this test as
emasculating the private attorneys general theory.1 2  The Court asserted
that the test's emphasis on the "important right" protected, without a
definition of "important," would make it applicable to virtually all sub-
stantive legislation.' 21 Thus "if any statutory policy is deemed so im-
portant" that attorneys' fees should be awarded to those who enforce it,
the Court demanded, "how could a court deny attorneys' fees to private
litigants in actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking to vindicate constitu-
tional rights ?,,122 Under Justice Marshall's test, however, fees would be
awarded only in those section 1983 actions where shifting the cost to the
defendant would place the burden on the class that benefits from the
suit. 28 This limitation seems consistent with the Court's traditional concern
that unjust enrichment be avoided 1 24 and envisions the private attorneys
general concept as quite similar to the common benefit theory. 125 The dis-
sent thus recognizes the equitable basis for the private attorneys general con-
cept and rightfully attacks "the inadequacy of the [majority's] analysis.' 26
PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION AND THE AMERICAN RULE
As society has become more complex, an increasing number of difficult
and important social problems of a type ordinarily treated by legislative
115. Id. at 263-64. See also text accompanying note 91 supra.
116. Id. at 284-85.
117. Id. at 285-86. See also notes 96-98 and accompanying text and note 108 supra.
118. Id. at 286-87.
119. Id. at 288.
120. Id. at 264-67 n.39.
121. Id. at 266-67 n.39.
122. Id. at 264 (emphasis in text).
123. See id. at 285.
124. The common benefit exception developed because of this concern. See text
accompanying notes 59-79 and text following note 100 supra.
125. 421 U.S. at 284: "[W ]e have already recognized several of the same factors
in the recent common-benefit cases." See also text accompanying note 143 infra.
126. Id. at 282.
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action have been left unresolved or unenforced by those primarily respon-
sible for their solution. Frustrated citizens and groups with diverse
economic resources have increasingly turned to the courts for assistance
when other resources have failed them. 127 Initial successes in areas such
as desegregation, 1 28 environmental protection,129 or prison reform, 30 have
encouraged other citizens, concerned with the general welfare, to bring
their problems to court when the law, or the official charged with its
administration, seems to offer no relief.' 31 The complex public interest
lawsuit has emerged, generally distinguished by issues of extreme social
importance, often involving complex statutory schemes, or inspired by
the "strength of Congressional policy.' 32 Their complexity and importance
often protract the litigation substantially. They often generate injunctive
relief that benefits a substantially greater number of people than the liti-
gants themselves but do not generally result in monetary damage awards. 33
Without any provision for fee-shifting, the expenses involved in these
suits and the harsh reality of the unlikelihood of any substantial monetary
recovery from which attorneys' fees could be paid 34 foreclose many poten-
127. See, e.g., Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400 (1967);
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) ; Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Cf. Bradley v. School Bd., 416 U.S. 696 (1974).
128. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
129. See, e.g., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971);
Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 484 F.2d 1331 (1st Cir. 1972) ; La Raza
Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
130. See, e.g., Taylor v. Perini, 503 F.2d 899 (6th Cir. 1974) ; Hoitt v. Vitek, 495
F.2d 219 (1st Cir. 1974).
131. Liberalized rules of standing to sue gave greater access to the courts to
those who challenged the legality of corporate and government action or inaction.
See United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP),
412 U.S. 669 (1973) ; Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972) ;
Association of Data Processing Service Org. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970); Flast
v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968); Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354
F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. v.
Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
Yet other cases restrict access by limiting class actions. E.g., Eisen V.
Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974) ; see note 185 infra; Zahn v. International
Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973) and text accompanying notes 182-85 infra; Sierra
Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 756 (1972) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
132. La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94, 99 (N.D. Cal. 1972). La Raza, a
class action suit to enjoin construction of a highway, was the first case to apply
the private attorneys general concept in awarding fees in environmental litigation.
133. 57 F.R.D. at 101.
134. The damages available in most public interest suits are meager at best in
relation to the complexity of the factual, legal and social issues involved. This was
recognized in NAACP v. Allen, 340 F. Supp. 703, 710 (M.D. Ala. 1972), where the
attorneys had sued in the public interest to preserve civil liberties for black Americans:
Because the probability of a large damage recovery is remote, .. .plaintiffs or
their lawyers who being class actions seeking to preserve civil liberties usually
must make substantial financial sacrifices. In addition, a lawyer . . . is likely to
suffer social, political and community ostracism [because of this kind of suit].
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tial litigants from the courts, 35 regardless of the importance of the
rights at issue.
The litigation surrounding the Trans-Alaska Pipeline typifies the
public interest lawsuit. The matter at issue, the development of an inde-
pendent American oil supply, had enormous international and domestic
implications.'3 6 Efforts at development posed major dangers to persons,
property, and the environment if the project were undertaken without the
more adequate and comprehensive planning and safeguards 137 the environ-
mentalists' suit sought to insure. In its eagerness to develop the oil dis-
covery, the Department of the Interior chose an expedient means of
development 3 s which was subsequently found to violate the Mineral Land
Leasing Act. 139 Since private suit was the only available means of forcing
the government to consider adequately the impact of the pipeline as origi-
nally engineered, the moderately funded Wilderness Society and its co-
plaintiffs devoted five years to this suit, consuming over forty thousand
hours of attorneys' time. The attorneys' work was arduous litigation
against a powerful oil company consortium which used its full panoply
of legal resources in defense. 140 The traditional argument that fee-shifting
would deter litigants from defending lawsuits is surely inapplicable to
the Alyeska situation, where the plaintiffs' atttorneys' fees were "paltry in
comparison with the interest [over one billion dollars] Alyeska had in
defending this appeal.' 14 1 To encourage other private citizen groups to
shoulder complex burdens, such as these, against such large and resource-
ful defendants, 142 there must be the possibility that successful public interest
litigation will carry with it an award of attorneys' fees.
135. Although it might be suggested that fee-shifting is unnecessary because poor
Americans can use Legal Aid to bring these kinds of suits, Legal Aid has not proved
a viable alternative because of its limited funding. A realistic method of fee-shifting
would encourage more attorneys to undertake this kind of litigation for all clients.
See Nussbaum, supra note 2, at 303-05. Professor Ehrenzweig, supra note 45, at
1230, warned:
If the bar continues to neglect needed reform, not only in its system of fees but
also in the availability of legal services, the legal profession could conceivably suffer
the same fate of the medical profession - that is, some form of "Legicare," a
Government-financed legal service for all.
136. See note 14 supra.
137. See notes 25, 26, 97 and accompanying texts supra.
138. See note 25 supra.
139. See note 21 and accompanying text supra.
140. Brief for Respondent, Wilderness Society, Appendix.
141. Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 495 F.2d 1029, 1032 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
142. For examples of suits involving large corporate defendants, see Trafficante
v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972) ; Merola v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,
493 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1974); Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421
(8th Cir. 1970); Kober v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 325 F. Supp. 467 (W.D. Pa.
1971), aff'd 480 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1973). Examples of suits against powerful unions
include Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1 (1973); Yablonski v. United Mine Workers of
America, 466 F.2d 424 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 918 (1973). For
suits involving large governmental defendants, see United States v. SCRAP, 412
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The issues involved in public interest lawsuits, such as Alyeska, are
conceptually similar to many of those involved in cases in which the ex-
panded common benefit and improper conduct exceptions have been in-
voked. Generally, all of these cases are brought by private parties litigating
issues that substantially affect the welfare of other non-parties, often afford-
ing a general benefit to a wide number of citizen-beneficiaries. Frequently,
the defendant has acted improperly or in bad faith. 143 These similarities
prompted lower federal courts to exercise their discretionary powers and
view these similarities to the recognized exceptions as a basis for adopting
the private attorneys general rationale as a judicial remedy for the financial
obstacles confronting public interest litigation. 44 But these lower courts
did so only after the Supreme Court provided a supportive milieu for
further encroachments on the American Rule.' 45 The Court in Newman
v. Piggie Park Enterprises,146 had construed Title II of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 to permit an award of attorneys' fees for the purpose of en-
couraging the initiation of similar suits to enjoin racial discrimination in
public accommodations. 147 The Court reasoned that "[i]f [a plaintiff]
obtains an injunction, he does so not for himself alone but also as a 'private
attorney general' vindicating a policy that Congress considered of the
highest priority.' 14  Although the suit was brought under a statute that
explicitly authorized fee-shifting at the discretion of the courts, Newman
identified the underlying theory as that of the private attorney general and
raised a presumption in favor of shifting the prevailing party's fees, re-
buttable only by a showing of "special circumstances [that] would render
such an award unjust."' 49
U.S. 669 (1973) (Interstate Commerce Commission as defendant); Taylor v. Perini,
503 F.2d 899 (6th Cir. 1974) (Superintendent of Ohio prisons as defendant) ; Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 484 F.2d 1331 (1st Cir. 1973) ; La Raza
Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (California Highway Department,
California Department of Public Works, Chief Highway Engineer of California, and
United States Secretary of Transportation as defendants).
143. For discussion of the common benefit exception, see notes 61-79 and accom-
panying text supra; for a discussion of the bad faith exception, see notes 80-88 and
accompanying text supra.
144. See cases cited note 8 supra.
145. See Northcross v. Board of Educ., 412 U.S. 427 (1973); Hall v. Cole, 412
U.S. 1 (1973); Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970); Newman v.
Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400 (1968). The Court in Alyeska did not
deal with the implication of these cases; rather, it used the narrowest view of their
holdings to fit them into the recognized exceptions: Mills and Hall into the common
benefit exception, 421 U.S. at 258, Piggie Park and Northcross as statutorially
authorized, 421 U.S. at 262. Cf. Dawson, Public Interest Litigation, supra note 32,
at 866-70.
146. 390 U.S. 400 (1968).
147. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1970).
148. 390 U.S. at 402 (emphasis added).
149. Id.
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Adopting the reasoning of Newman in a later suit brought under
another statute' 50 that also made an award of attorneys' fees discretionary,
a unanimous Court held, in Northcross v. Board of Education,151 that the
plaintiffs were "private attorneys general" and thus entitled to an award
of attorneys' fees. 152 Even though consistent with legislative mandate, the
Court's action seemed expansive, encouraging many other private attor-
neys general to bring similar suits. Lower federal courts, guided by this
spirit, responded by awarding attorneys' fees pursuant to the private
attorneys general theory under other discretionary statutes5'" and statutes
silent in regard to fee-shifting. 154 Encouraged by the Supreme Court and
drawing on their own equity powers, the lower federal courts thus
fashioned the private attorneys general exception to the American Rule.
Although the Supreme Court had acted, and the lower courts had
quickly followed, to allow fee-shifting to encourage suits in the public
interest,'5 5 a policy that awarded fees in this area in the absence of some
statutory authority was never explicitly sanctioned. 56 Nevertheless, by
awarding attorneys' fees without enunciating any specific constraints on
when this was appropriate, and by mandating that other courts do the
same,1' 7 Newman and cases following it raised the hope that judicial
repudiation of the American Rule, or at the least an adoption of the private
attorneys general rule as a general judicial remedy in public interest litiga-
tion, would soon be a reality. 158
THE IMPACT OF Alyeska
THE AMERICAN RULE REITERATED
These repeated hopes that the American Rule would be at least modi-
fied were dashed decisively by Alyeska. In its rejection of the private
attorneys general exception as a judicial discretionary remedy, the
150. The Emergency School Aid Act of 1972 § 718, 20 U.S.C. § 1617 (Supp.
II, 1972).
151. 412 U.S. 427 (1973).
152. Id. at 428.
153. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964 tit. VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1970).
154. See, e.g., Mills, discussed at notes 70-74 supra; Hall discussed at notes
75-77 supra.
155. See note 145 supra.
156. It is true that the statutes involved in Mills and Hall, the Securities Act of
1934 § 14(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1970) and the LMRDA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-12
(1970), respectively, were silent regarding fee-shifting. Yet because the statutes
were passed specifically to protect the institutions involved, and the individuals in
those institutions, from future abuses of individual rights, it can be argued that Con-
gressional intent to encourage private enforcement was implicit. By fee-shifting,
the Court acted pursuant to this intent by encouraging other possible private plain-
tiffs to sue.
157. See text accompanying note 149 supra.
158. See Nussbaum; Equal Access; After Mills; and Judicial Green Light, supra
note 2.
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Court turned away from the Mills'5 9-Newman'60 enlargements and to-
wards the views of an earlier case, Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier
Brewing Co. 161 In Fleischmann, the Court refused to apply the bad faith
exception as a rationale to award the plaintiff his attorneys' fees where
the defendant had caused the suit by deliberately infringing plaintiff's
patent in violation of the Lanham Act. 162 The Court held that federal
courts lacked power to award attorneys' fees even in cases of bad faith on
the part of the defendant when the statute creating the cause of action
expressly provided remedies for its vindication without including fee-
shifting provisions. 163 Implicit in the Court's approach is the notion that
the bad faith or any other recognized exception to the American Rule is
inadequate to accomplish fee-shifting if juxtaposed against a statute creat-
ing the cause of action which specified the relief available without men-
tioning attorneys' fees. M11ills, decided after Fleischmann,16 4 seemed to
contradict directly the Fleischmann position by holding that attorneys'
fees could be awarded to the prevailing plaintiff suing under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, even though the section sued under was silent
regarding plaintiff's attorneys' fees. 165 But the Court returned to its
Fleischmann approach in F.D. Rich Co. v. United States ex rel. Industrial
Lumber Co.166 In Rich, the plaintiff, a supplier of building materials, sued
to collect against a payment bond posted in favor of a government con-
tractor under the Miller Act.167 The plaintiff had not been paid by a com-
pany alleged by plaintiff to be a subcontractor of the defendant government
contractor. The suit established that the debtor was in fact a subcontractor,
thus giving the plaintiff access to the bond under the Act. The Supreme
Court reversed the court of appeals decision allowing plaintiff to recover
attorneys' fees because, as in Fleischmann, the statute creating the cause of
action, although allowing the plaintiff to recover "sums justly due," con-
tained no provision for fee-shifting. 168 The Court noted the existing policy
arguments for fee-shifting and the judicial remedies for affecting it,16 9
but foreshadowed Alyeska by nevertheless refusing to depart from the
159. See text accompanying notes 70-79 supra.
160. See text accompanying notes 147-49 supra.
161. 386 U.S. 714 (1967).
162. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (Supp. IV, 1974).
163. 386 U.S. at 720. The Court returned to the traditional position on the Ameri-
can Rule, asserting that it protects a losing litigant and encourages the poor to sue.
164. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970), was decided three years
after Fleischmann.
165. When Fleischmann was restricted to its facts in Mills, 396 U.S. at 391, the
reasonable inference was that Fleischmann would be of dubious precedential value in the
future. See After Mills, supra note 2, at 328, and Nussbaum, supra note 2, at 321, 335.
166. 417 U.S. 116 (1974).
167. 40 U.S.C. § 270a (1970) (requiring contractors' bonds on government
contracts).
168. 417 U.S. at 128, construing 40 U.S.C. § 270b(a) (1970).
169. Id. at 128-31.
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American Rule without congressional sanction. 170 At the time of the Rich
and the Fleischmann decisions, these cases could have been viewed simply
as an unwillingess of the Court to award attorneys fees by applying the
bad faith exception to situations involving improper private conduct among
competitors within a commercial context. But if Rich and Fleischmann
are viewed as part of the approach that developed more fully in Alyeska,
continued use of the bad faith as well as the common benefit exception
may be doubtful absent statutory guidance. While these cases can be
viewed narrowly, the more natural interpretation for the Fleischmann-
Rich-Alyeska chain is that the Court has made judicial restraint on awards
of attorneys' fees the general rule again and it is the exceptions which
will be viewed narrowly in the future.
And yet the Court could have used its equity powers to fashion a
private attorneys general exception to the American Rule.1 71 These were
the same equitable powers exercised by the Court when it acted to avert
injustice by fashioning a remedy to allow the plaintiff to recover his
attorneys' fees from a common fund172 and then expanded the remedy to
award a plaintiff his attorneys' fees because his suit had vindicated the
constitutional rights of others. 17 3 The Court's history of broadening the
common benefit exception and its increased use of the improper conduct
exception could have been stepping stones to the adoption of the private
attorneys general concept. What is missing in the Court's analysis in
Alyeska is a sensitivity to the practical results of the suit' 74 accompanied
by a perspective broader than the narrow focus on the individual plaintiffs'
relationship to the subject matter of the suit. The rather curt dismissal
of the substantial benefit accruing to the public as a result of the suit 1 75
and of the benefits inherent in encouraging private citizens to sue in the
public interest through the promise of attorneys' fees176 led to the Court's
refusal to take another step to avoid injustice in public interest litigation.
Although such a step would have led to the shifting of attorneys' fees to
170. Id. at 130-31.
171. See 421 U.S. at 274, 282 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ; notes 110-16 and accom-
panying text supra.
172. Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527 (1882), discussed at text accompanying
notes 61-62 supra.
173. Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1 (1973), discussed at text accompanying notes
75-77 supra.
174. For a discussion of the benefits conferred by the suit, see text accompanying
notes 96-98 supra; for a discussion of the difficulties involved in the suit and the
implications from them, see text accompanying notes 140-42 supra.
175. The Court implicitly agreed that the litigation produced a substantial benefit,
as evidenced by its acceptance of the lower court's finding, 421 U.S. at 259, and its
ignoring the dissent in the lower court, which vigorously objected to finding any
benefit in the plaintiffs' suit.
176. "It is also apparent from our national experience that the encouragement of
private action to implement public policy has been viewed as desirable in a variety
of circumstances." 421 U.S. at 271.
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the losing defendant in public interest suits for the first time, the Court
had clearly done this type of shifting before in the improper conduct
exceptions.177 Similarly, since the Court had allowed shifting of attorneys'
fees in suits brought under statutes silent regarding attorneys' fees,178
and even had created a presumption in favor of fee-shifting when a statute
had prescribed it as discretionary ;179 it was only a small step to allowing
attorneys' fees in cases in which there was no statutory authorization.
But the Court refused to take that forward step, retreating instead to a
reliance on Congress to make a decision "on a policy matter that [it] has
reserved for itself." s
PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION AFTER Alyeska
In the aftermath of Alyeska, we are left with a sadly limping, slightly
stunned public interest litigation movement even though the damage may
be mainly to the movement's morale and not necessarily to its corpus.' 8 '
In fact, Alyeska is actually the second case in a one-two punch thrown by
the Supreme Court, seemingly aimed at knocking out public interest
litigation, especially in the form of class action suits. The first blow was
dealt in Zahn v. International Paper Co.,i8 2 where the Supreme Court
held in a public interest lawsuit that a class action 8 3 can be maintained
only when each member of the class, whether participating in the suit
or not, satisfies the ten thousand dollar jurisdiction amount requirement
for suits brought in the federal courts.'8 4 While the Alyeska plaintiffs
177. See text accompanying notes 80-88 supra.
178. See, e.g., Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970), and Hall v.
Cole, 412 U.S. 1 (1973), discussed in text accompanying notes 70-74 and 75-77 supra.
179. See Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400 (1968), discussed
at text accompanying notes 146-49 supra.
180. 421 U.S. at 269. The Court did not specify how Congress has made this
reservation, however.
181. Although Ralph Nader predicted that Alyeska "is going to have a very
depressive impact on the ability of public interest lawyers to litigate" unless Con-
gress responds with a statutory authorization for fee-shifting in public interest cases,
public interest law firms had only begun to expect fees to be paid by the defendants
under a private attorneys general theory. TIME, May 26, 1975, at 42. In fact, the
fees that had been awarded under this theory generally were insufficient to adequately
compensate the attorneys. See Witt, After Alyeska: Can the Contender Survive?,
5 JuRis DOCTOR 34, 35, 39 (October, 1975) [hereinafter cited as Witt]. The impact
of Alyeska can be minimized if the attorneys take care to bring suit under those
statutes that specifically provide for awards of attorney's fees. Certainly environ-
mental litigation seem most clearly injured by Alyeska because the National Environ-
mental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1970), has no fee award provision.
182. 414 U.S. 291 (1973).
183. Suit was commenced under FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b) (3).
184. The suit was brought under diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1332(a) (1970). The Court, interpreting this statute, construed legislative silence
regarding aggregation of claims as a prohibition against it, 414 U.S. at 302, and noted
that its result would be the same under the general federal question jurisdiction
statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970). 414 U.S. at 302 n..
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were not affected by this monetary interest requirement, Zahn created a
rigid rule the persuasive effect of which must be to inhibit the bringing of
public interest class-action suits.'8 5 Taken together, Zahn and Alyeska
have dealt a powerful blow to the environmental protection movement,
and to public interest litigation generally, by substantially reducing the
opportunity to bring class action suits in the federal courts and by severely
eroding the economic ability to assert environmental rights. 8 6
Edelman v. Jordan,s 7 which preceded Alyeska by a few months,
may soon be felt as another blow to public interest litigation. In Edelman,
the plaintiff brought a class action suit for injunctive and declaratory
relief against the Illinois officials administering the federal-state programs
of Aid to the Aged, Blind, and Disabled (AABD).188 Edelman claimed
that the Illinois Department of Public Aid, in not processing his claim to
disability benefits for almost four months, violated federal law requiring
eligibility determinations within thirty or forty-five days of application
and the receipt of the assistance check within those periods for eligible
applicants. 8 9 His suit was successful, and the district court issued an
injunction to require compliance with the federal regulations and ordered
all retroactive benefits be paid to eligible persons who had applied for
them.190 In reversing the court of appeals as to retroactive payments.,
185. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974), imposed a further re-
straint on commencing class actions by holding that plaintiffs in class action suits
are required to bear the cost of notice to members of the class, regardless of the size
of the class or the expense of the notice, and that such cost could not be imposed
on the defendant, regardless of the likelihood that the plaintiff class would ultimately
prevail on the merits.
186. In the future, the private plaintiff will have no opportunity to recover his
attorneys' fees unless the litigation is brought under a statute providing for fee-
shifting, as in note 4 supra, or unless he can persuade the courts that his suit clearly
fits into the common benefit exception. The vitality of the common benefit exception
is diminished, however, and that of the improper conduct exceptions, discussed at
notes 80-88 and accompanying text supra, is dubious at best after Fleischmann and
Rich. See text following note 170 supra. But see cases cited note 200 infra. Certainly
Alyeska will influence lower courts to restrict, not enlarge, these exceptions and thus
in large measure will foreclose fee-shifting. Until, and unless, Congress acts to
authorize wider fee-shifting, the Court has sacrificed these public interest lawsuits
and the plaintiffs who bring them, in spite of its recognition that "the encouragement
of private action to implement public policy has been viewed as desirable in a variety
of circumstances." 421 U.S. at 271.
187. 415 U.S. 651 (1974), rev'g sub nom., Jordan v. Weaver, 472 F.2d 985 (7th
Cir. 1973).
188. This program was funded by federal and state governments. 42 U.S.C. §§
1381-85 (Supp. IV, 1970).
189. Title 45 C.F.R. § 2 06.10(a) (3) (1968) required, at the time the suit was
instituted, that applications for Aid to the Aged or Blind be processed within thirty
days of receipt and that applications for aid to the disabled be processed within forty-
five days.
190. See Jordan v. Weaver, 472 F.2d 985, 988 (7th Cir. 1973), affirming the
judgment of the lower court,
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the Supreme Court held that the eleventh amendment immunity of states
from suits in the federal courts precluded, absent state consent to the suit,
the entry of an award of retroactive statutory benefits against state officials
where the state, and not the individuals, would pay the benefits. 191 Even
though the Court in Alyeska expressly did not extend the eleventh amend-
ment interpretation espoused in Edelman to preclude the award of counsel
fees against state defendants, 9 2 lower courts are currently divided on
this question. 193 The conservative tendencies of this Court'94 suggest
that such an extension is likely to come.195 The result may be that even
where an award of attorneys' fees is permissible under an exception to the
American Rule, it would remain an inefficacious remedy if the defendants
to the suit were immune from an award of fees. 196
CONCLUSION
In a very real sense, it is too early to measure Alyeska's impact on
public interest litigation. Although the initial reaction to Alyeska was
dismay,197 a more careful consideration must note that in general only
191. 415 U.S. at 678.
192. 421 U.S. at 269-70 n.44. Some lower federal courts, however, have already
extended Edelman to immunize states and state officials. Skehan v. Trustees, 501
F.2d 31 (3d Cir. 1974).
193. Compare Souza v. Travisono, 512 F.2d 1137 (1st Cir. 1975); Class v.
Norton, 505 F.2d 123 (2d Cir. 1974) ; Jordon v. Fusari, 496 F.2d 646 (2d Cir. 1974);
Brandenburger v. Thompson, 494 F.2d 885 (9th Cir. 1974); Gates v. Collier, 489
F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1973); Sims v. Amos, 340 F. Supp. 691 (M.D. Ala.), aff'd mem.,
409 U.S. 942 (1972), with Taylor v. Perini, 503 F.2d 899 (6th Cir. 1974) ; Skehan v.
Trustees, 501 F.2d 31 (3d Cir. 1974) ; Jordon v. Gilligan, 500 F.2d 701 (6th Cir. 1974) ;
Named Indiv. Members v. Texas Highway Dep't, 496 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1974).
194. See Green, A Pro-Business Tilt in the Courts, The Wall Street Journal,
June 10, 1975, at 20, col. 3, which noted the current Supreme Court's "judicial con-
servatism": "It's not willing to go one step further than it has to." The ruling in
Alyeska, the author concluded, developed logically from this conservatism. But cf.
an editorial on the same page, A Case for Restraint, The Wall Street Journal, June
10, 1975, at 20, col. 1, which applauded the holding in Alyeska and, by implication, the
conservative Court.
195. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975), although noting that school officials
have merely a qualified good-faith immunity, suggests that intentional misconduct, not
mere harmful action, may be required in the future to justify damages awarded
directly against school, and by extension governmental, officials.
196. This immunity comes from either the eleventh amendment, see notes 192-93
and text accompanying note 194 supra or from 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1970), see note 33
and accompanying text supra. The results could be similar to that of Harrisburg
Coalition v. Volpe, 381 F. Supp. 898 (M.D. Pa. 1974), where a citizen's group
successfully sued under the Department of Transportation Act to enjoin highway
construction through a city park. The court refused to award the plaintiffs their
attorneys' fees because only the city officials of Harrisburg, the least culpable of all
the defendants, were not statutorially immune from paying them.
197. "They didn't just rule against us .... They threw out the whole development
in the lower courts that was moving in the direction of more and larger fees on this
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expectations were disappointed by the Supreme Court, not funds inter-
rupted.198 By deferring to a Congress that had manifested an awareness
of the problems presented by the American Rule even before Alyeska
was decided, 199 the Court could actually have helped public interest liti-
gants. If Congress acts to authorize fees taxed to losing defendants, even
against the government, ultimately the public at large will benefit. In that
case, Alyeska will be hardly remembered,200 significant merely as the im-
basis," said Charles Halpern of the Council for Public Interest Law, quoted in Witt,
supra note 181, at 35. See also Ralph Nader's reaction at note 181 supra.
198. See note 181 supra.
199. Even before the results of Alyeska were announced, some members of Con-
gress had already voiced approval for fee-shifting and there has been some prelimi-
nary Congressional debate on the matter. For example, regarding the Legal Services
Corporation Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 2996 (1974), "we expect that the courts will
award fees to legal service programs in cases where an award would be made to a
private attorney or where such officers are functioning like 'private attorneys general.'"
120 CONG. REc. 12953 (1974) (remarks of Senator Kennedy). See also id. at 12934-35
(remarks of Senator Abourezk). Senator Tunney has already conducted hearings
on attorneys' fees and fee-shifting. Hearings on Legal Fees Before the Subcomm. on
Representation of Citizen Interests of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong.,
1st Sess., pt. 3 (1973). It is reported that Senator Tunney is considering whether
amending existing statutes to authorize fee-shifting or a broad fee-shifting measure
would be the more effective. On Aug. 1, 1975, Senator Tunney introduced a bill
authorizing attorneys' fees to all prevailing parties in all civil rights cases.
Representative Seiberling has introduced H.R. 7825 and H.R. 8218 to amend
the Mineral Land Leasing Act, 30 U.S.C. § 185 (1970); H.R. 7829 and H.R. 8222
to amend the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1970);
H.R. 7828 and H.R. 8220 to amend some early civil rights statutes, and a bill to
amend the injunction section of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970), to allow
awards of attorneys' fees. He has introduced H.R. 7826 and H.R. 8221, which would
add a new section to Title 28 of the United States Code to award attorneys fees
in civil cases in federal courts at the judge's discretion, even against the United States
as a defendant. This would effectively reverse Alyeska without providing the guid-
ance the Supreme Court deemed indispensible. See text preceding note 91.
Representative Drinan has introduced H.R. 7968 which would assess attor-
neys' fees against the United States when a suit successfully challenges an agency
decision in civil rights, consumer, and environmental areas.
200. For the immediate present, however, Alyeska has made itself felt as the
authority by which awards are denied to successful plaintiffs. See, e.g., Ripon Soc'y
v. National Republican Party, 525 F.2d 548 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (remanding for a decision
consistent with Alyeska) ; Gilliam v. City of Omaha, 524 F.2d 1013 (8th Cir. 1975) ;
Burbank v. Twomey, 520 F.2d 744 (7th Cir. 1975) ; Kirkland v. Department of Cor-
rectional Services, 520 F.2d 420 (2d Cir. 1975); Named Indiv. Members v. Texas
Highway Dep't, 519 F.2d 1372 (5th Cir. 1975); Hallmark Clinic v. North Carolina
Dep't of Human Res., 519 F.2d 1315 (4th Cir. 1975) ; O'Neal v. Gresham, 519 F.2d
803 (4th Cir. 1975); Handler v. San Jacinto Jr. College, 519 F.2d 273 (5th Cir.
1975) ; Tryforos v. Icarian Dev. Corp., 518 F.2d 1258 (7th Cir. 1975); Turner v.
FCC, 514 F.2d 1354 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Natural Res. Defense Council v. EPA, 512
F.2d 1351 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Rasmussen v. City of Lake Forest, 404 F. Supp. 148
(N.D. Ill. 1975); Phillips v. Puryear, 403 F. Supp. 80 (W.D. Va. 1975).
Attorneys' fees have been awarded by the courts, in spite of Alyeska, in some
recent cases. See, e.g., Doe v. Poelker, 527 F.2d 605 (8th Cir. 1976) (reaffirming a
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petus for such informed congressional activity. But if Congress chooses
not to act at all, Alyeska will stand as a reaffirmation of the "traditional
American way of talking about equal access to the courts .. . [while] in
fact, because of economics, only government, large corporations and the
wealthy will normally have access.
'
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position in favor of fee awards because of improper conduct in "abortion litigation
involving the State of Missouri," enunciated by the same court in Doe v. Poelker,
515 F.2d 541, 547 (8th Cir. 1975)); Carter v. Noble, 526 F.2d 677 (5th Cir. 1976)
(for bad faith in cutting a prisoner's hair); McDonald v. Oliver, 525 F.2d 1217
(5th Cir. 1976) (for bad faith and oppressive conduct by union officials) ; Clemons v.
Runck, 402 F. Supp. 863 (S.D. Ohio 1975) (for bad faith in racial discrimination in
sale of property) ; Morris v. Board of Educ., 401 F. Supp. 188 (D. Del. 1975) (for
bad faith in firing teacher). Cf. SEC v. Aberdeen Securities Co., 526 F.2d 603 (3d
Cir. 1975) (remanded to determine if the common benefit exception could be applied
to the facts of the case).
201. Witt, supra note 181, at 41 (emphasis original).
